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ARTICLES
REFORM IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS:
UPSETTING TIE DELICATE BALANCE
BETWEEN AUTHORS, PERFORMERS AND
PRODUCERS OR PRAGMATISM IN
THE AGE OF DIGITAL PIRACY?
David Edward Agnew*
I. INTRODUCTION
International piracy of sound recordings is out of control.' Each year
the sound recording industry loses over $1.2 billion in worldwide sales
annually as a result of the illegal commercial pirating of sound recordings.
During 1990 alone, more than 400 million units of pirated recordings were
sold throughout the world. In some countries, such as the United States,
pirated sound recordings accounted for only a small percentage of the total
market (six percent), but added up to a tremendous loss in revenue ($470
* J.D., 1992, Columbia University School of Law. Associate, Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp.
The author wishes to thank Professor Jane Ginsburg of Columbia University School of Law and
Bob Clarida for their assistance with this Article. This Article was originally published in 4 ENT.
L. REV. 125 (1992).
1. Throughout this article the term "piracy" will be used to describe "the manufacture of
duplicates of legitimately produced phonograms without the authorization of the original producer
of the phonogram and the importation, distribution, or sale to the public of such unlawful
duplicates for commercial gain." GhIAN DAVIES, PIRACY OF PHONOGRAMS 4 (2d ed. 1986)
(para. 10). The term "sound recording" will be used instead of the term "phonogram," and in
accordance with the definitions contained in the two international conventions that currently
protect sound recordings, will refer to "any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance
or of other sounds." See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, art. 3(b), 496 U.N.T.S. 44
[hereinafter Rome Convention]; Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, art. l(a), 866 U.N.T.S.
72 [hereinafter Phonograms Convention].
2. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimates that losses for
1990 amounted to $1.2 billion and that losses for the preceding decade amounted to over $12
billion. See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, PIRACY REPORT
1 (1992). The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) estimates that worldwide
losses from piracy during 1990 amounted to $1.4 billion. Md. at 3.
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million)? In other countries, such as Poland, pirated recordings accounted
for the vast majority of the total market (an estimated ninety-six percent).4
Three independent legal interests exist in every sound recording, those
of: (1) the author of the underlying work (i.e., the composer), (2) the
performer of the work and (3) the producer' of the sound recording. All
three parties suffer financial losses from piracy. Authors and performers
lose their royalties and producers lose the return on their investments.
Much to the ire of these groups, record piracy shows no signs of abating.
The digital revolution in music has produced the compact disc, various
digital audio tape formats and other technologies which offer consumers
unprecedented sound fidelity, durability and ease of use. Unfortunately,
such technology also offers sound-recording pirates the ideal means to mass
produce "perfect" copies.
Prior to the recent threat of digital piracy, the international community
recognized that sound recordings require international legal protection.
Accordingly, producers of sound recordings have been afforded protection
by two international conventions:6 (1) the International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations ("Rome Convention")7 and (2) the Convention for the
3. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, PIRACY REPORT (Stat.
Supp., Mar. 1992).
4. Id
5. Throughout this Article, "producer" refers to "the person who, or the legal entity which,
first fixes the sounds of a performance or other sounds." See Rome Convention, supra note 1,
at 46 (art. 3(c)); Phonogram Convention, supra note 1, at 72 (art. l(b)). In other words, "[t]he
producer is the person or company for whom the recording is being made. This will be the record
company where the artist has a recording contract with a record company and will be a production
company in the case of any artist who is contracted to his own or a third-party production
company:' DAVIES, supra note 1, at 36 (para. 103). For discussion of the distinction between
a "producer" as herein defined and a "record producer' or "recording engineer," see infra note
88 and accompanying text.
6. In addition to these international conventions, according to the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), "there are some 40 countries that provide protection to the producers of
sound recordings in their copyright laws and among those 40 countries, some 12 ... expressly
state that sound recordings are literary and artistic works and a few of the 12 also state that
copyright vests in the producer." WORLD INTELLECUAL PROPERTY ORGANZATION, QUESTIONS
CONCERNING A POSSIBLE PROTOCOL TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 20 (1991) [hereinafter WIPO
PROTOCOL] (pt. I, para. 58).
7. Finalized on October 26, 1961, at the end of a Diplomatic Conference held in Rome under
the auspices of the United International Bureaux for the Protection of International Property
(BIRPI), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the
International Labor Organisation (LO), this convention came into force on May, 18, 1964. See
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GuIDE rO THE ROME CONVENTION AND TO
THE PHONOGRAMS CoNvENTION 7 (WIPO 1981) [hereinafter WIPO GUIDE]. As of September
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Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication
of Their Phonograms ("Phonograms Convention").8 Both Conventions
arose as a response to the dearth of protection provided to producers of
sound recordings by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works,9 and to a lesser extent by the Universal Copyright
Convention. 0
This Article will analyze the protection presently afforded to
producers of sound recordings under the Berne Convention, the Rome
Convention and the Phonograms Convention. It will then assess a recently
proposed protocol to the Berne Convention," which would, in effect,
amend the Berne Convention to provide "author-like" protection to
producers of sound recordings in ways similar to the Rome and Phono-
grams Conventions. This Article concludes that the granting of Berne
Convention protection to producers of sound recordings is the most efficient
means of protecting the interests of not only producers, but also those of
authors and performers, all of whom face an uphill battle in the brave new
world of digital piracy.
11. THE BERNE CONVENTION
The Berne Convention protects "the rights of authors in their literary
and artistic works."12  It guarantees authors the exclusive rights to
authorize the reproduction, translation and public performance (including
30, 1992, thirty-eight countries had joined the Rome Convention. Treaties (Status on Jan. 1,
1992), 28 COPYRIGHT 9 (WIPO 1992); Notification Concerning Treaties Administered by WIPO
in the Field of Copyright, 28 COPYRIGHT 301 (WIPO 1992) (Rome Convention-Accession:
Australia). See also U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH TIE
SECRETARY-GENERAL at 614, U.N. Doe. ST/LEGISER.E/10, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.4 (1992).
S. Finalized on October 29, 1971, at the end of a Diplomatic Conference held in Geneva
under the auspices of WIPO and UNESCO, this convention came into force on April 18, 1973.
See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 7, at 91. As of January 1, 1992, forty-three countries had joined
the Phonograms Convention. Treaties (Status on Jan. 1, 1992), 28 COPYRIGHT 10 (WIPO 1992).
See also U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED wrrH THE
SECRErARY-GENERAL at 619, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/10, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.4 (1992).
9. July 24, 1971, Hein's No. KAV 2245 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. All references to
the Berne Convention are to the Paris Act, completed on July 24, 1971. As of January 1992,
ninety countries had joined the Berne Convention. Treaties (Status on Jan. 1, 1992), 28
COPYRIGHT 6-8 (WIPO 1992).
10. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1343, 943 U.N.T.S. 194.
11. See generally WIPO PROrOCOL, supra note 6.
12. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 1 (art.I).
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broadcasting) of their works. 3 It also protects authors' moral rights.14
It does not, however, provide any protection to producers of sound record-
ings, for two reasons: (1) producers of sound recordings are not considered
"authors" and (2) sound recordings are not considered "literary [or] artistic
works."'
15
The term "author" is not defined in the Berne Convention. It is
generally understood, however, that the term refers to natural persons. This
inference is drawn from the Berne Convention's basic term of protection
being dependent upon the life of the author plus fifty years, which "is
inappropriate in the case of corporate entities which may have an indetermi-
nate existence;" ' 6 the inclusion of Article 14bis, which "makes specific
allowance for those legal systems where the author (or 'maker') of a
cinematographic work may be a corporate person;"" and the existence of
other conventions, such as the Rome Convention and Phonograms
Convention, specifically established to protect subject matter whose makers
are not regarded as authors and may not be natural persons.
Unlike the term "author," the phrase "literary and artistic works" is at
least somewhat defined in the Berne Convention. Article 2(1) provides a
non-exhaustive list of various "production[s] in the literary, scientific and
artistic domain."'" This list does not include "sound recordings."' 9
13. ld. at 7-8 (arts. 9(1), 8, 11(2), 1 lbis(1), respectively).
14. Id. at 5 (art. 6bis) (rights of attribution and integrity).
15. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 1 (art. 1).
16. SAM RIcKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTIsTIc WORKs: 1886-1986, 159 (1987); see also Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 5 (art.
7(1)).
17. RICKETSON, supra note 16, at 159.
18. Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention reads as follows:
The expression "literary and artistic works" shall include every production in the
literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses,
sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works;
choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with
or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed
by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture,
sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated
works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art;
illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, topography, architecture or science.
Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 1-2.
According to Claude Masouy6, a noted French scholar:.
By merely listing examples, the Convention allows member countries to go further
and treat other productions in the literary, scientific and artistic domain as protected
works .... Of course, the fact that a country treats a sound recording as a work
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According to Professor Sam Ricketson, author of a noted treatise on the
Berne Convention, the explanation for the exclusion of sound recordings
from the list of protected subject matter "is probably better expressed in
terms of history than any argument based on the relative merits of the skills
required for [such] production."' Although sound recordings may be
characterized as derivative works based upon pre-existing literary or artistic
works, their derivative character cannot explain their exclusion from the
Berne Convention; the Berne Convention has always accorded protection
to derivative subject matter, such as translations, adaptations and musical
arrangements." It has been argued that a difference may be found in the
mechanical or technical nature of the recorder's work.22  However,
photographs and motion pictures are included within the scope of the Berne
Convention even though the skill of the photographer or cinematographer
is often of a mechanical nature. As Ricketson points out, "[t]he truth is
that there is no logical reason, based on the need for literary or artistic
creation, why [sound recordings] should not be protected under the Berne
Convention."'  The underlying rationale of the Berne Convention's
position will be discussed below in Part VI(A).
il. THE ROME CONVENTION
In 1964, the Rome Convention filled the void left open by the Berne
Convention with respect to the so-called "neighboring rights" of performers,
broadcasters and producers of sound recordings.' Among its many
provisions, the Rome Convention expressly protects producers against the
protected by copyright does not mean that other Beme Union countries have any
obligation to do the same.
CLAUDE MAsoUYP, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENnON FOR THE PROTECeION OF LrmRARY AND
ARTISTICWORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 17 (WIPO 1978).
19. This is so despite repeated attempts by the British delegation to accord international
copyright protection to sound recordings at both the 1908 Berlin Conference and the 1928 Rome
Conference on the Berne Convention. The Brussels Conference of 1948 did, however, pass "a
resolution, expressing the wish that countries of the Union should consider the best means of
assuring the protection of recordings of musical works, without prejudice to the rights of authors."
RICKETSON, supra note 16, at 310.
20. Id. at 308.
21. Id. at 867. See Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 7-9 (arts. 8, 11, 12, respectively).
22. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
23. RICKEMON, supra note 16, at 867.
24. See generally Rome Convention, supra note 1. For discussion of neighboring rights see
HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM, The Nature of Neighboring Rights of Performing Artists, Phonogram
Producers and Broadcasting Organizations, 15 COLUM-VLA 1L & ARTS 75 (1990).
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unauthorized duplication of their sound recordings3O In certain respects,
the Rome Convention is fundamentally different from the Berne Conven-
tion. While the Berne Convention protects works per se, the Rome
Convention protects specified beneficiaries.2'6 Moreover, while the Berne
Convention "was largely the result of a consensus between the national
laws of its member countries as to what should be protected and how this
should be done," the Rome Convention undertook an "educational role" and
sought to define "the rights that states should incorporate into their
laws."'2 7
The Rome Convention, however, is not totally dissimilar to the Berne
Convention. Like the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention is based on
the principle of national treatment.2' The principle of national treatment
means that each contracting state must extend the same protection to
beneficiaries from other contracting states as it does to its own nationals.
Article 5(1) of the Rome Convention provides that each contracting state
must grant national treatment in three instances. First, national treatment
must be accorded when a producer is a national of a contracting state.29
This ensures protection for producers from Rome Convention countries
wherever their products are sold. Second, national treatment must be
accorded when the first fixation of a sound recording is made in a
contracting state.30 This allows producers from non-contracting states to
enjoy protection for their recordings if they are made within Rome
Convention territory. Third, national treatment must be accorded when a
sound recording is first published in another contracting state. 1 This
allows a record company to protect its entire catalog of sound recordings
25. Article 10 of the Rome Convention provides: "Producers of phonograms shall enjoy the
right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms." Rome
Convention, supra note 1, at 50 (art. 10). "Indirect reproduction" refers to reproduction "by use
of a record pressed [from the original master], or by recording a radio or TV program which
contains a phonogram." WIPO GUIDE, supra note 6, at 43.
26. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 44 (art. 2(1)) with Berne Convention, supra
note 9, at 3 (art. 3(1)).
27. RICKeTSON, supra note 16, at 872 (emphasis added). As a "'pioneer Convention,' ...
[i]n order to join ... most States needed to legislate to create the rights provided for in the
Convention." Gillian Davies, Twenty-five Years of the Rome Convention: A Tribute to its
Success, COPYRIGHT BULL., Vol. XX, No. 4, 1986, at 15.
28. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 44, 46, 48 (arts. 2, 5) with Berne
Convention, supra note 9, at 4 (art. 5).
29. Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 46 (art. 5(1)(a)).
30. Id. at 46 (art. 5(l)(b)).
31. Id. at 48 (art. 5(l)(c)).
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merely by first, (or simultaneously), publishing them in a contracting
state.32 However, in order to allow as many countries as possible to join,
the Rome Convention allows each contracting state to reserve the right not
to apply either of the latter two criteria.33
Another similarity to the Berne Convention is Article 15(1) of the
Rome Convention. Article 15(1) allows contracting states to provide,-for
exceptions with respect to private use, use of short excerpts for news
reporting, ephemeral fixation by a broadcasting organization by means of
its own facilities and for its own broadcasts, and use for the purposes of
teaching or scientific research.' In addition to these exceptions, Article
15(2) permits contracting states to legislate "the same kinds of limitations
with regard to the protection of... producers of phonograms ... as it
provides.., in connexion [sic] with the protection of copyright in literary
and artistic works,"35 but restricts compulsory licenses to those termed
"compatible!' with the Convention. In operation, however, the Rome
Convention's notion of "compatibility" does not allow for any compulsory
licenses to override the refusal of the producer.36
Article 12 of the Rome Convention addresses secondary uses of sound
recordings. It provides for payment of "a single equitable remuneration"
to producers, performers, or both, when their sound recordings are
broadcast or in any manner communicated to the public.3" In addition, it
provides that "[d]omestic law may, in the absence of agreement between
these parties, lay down the conditions as to the sharing of this remunera-
tion."38 However, contracting states have the ability to decide the extent
to which they wish to protect producers against secondary use. For
instance, Article 16(1) permits a member country to refuse to apply Article
12 in its entirety, to refuse remuneration for "certain uses," to refuse
remuneration to producers of sound recordings who are not nationals of
another contracting state, or to limit protection to producers of sound
recordings who are nationals of another contracting state to material
32. See i. at 48 (art. 5(2) (simultaneous publication)).
33. Id at 48, 56 (arts. 5(3), 17). This provision was "inserted to accommodate the
Scandinavian countries which had recently passed new laws on neighboring rights." WIPO
GUIDE, supra note 7, at 63.
34. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 54 (art. 15(1)) with Berne Convention, supra
note 9, at 7-9 (arts. 9(2), 10(1), 10bis, llbis(3), 10(2). respectively).
35. Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 54 (art. 15(2)).
36. See WIPO GuIDE, supra note 7, at 18. Cf. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 9 (art. 13).
37. Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 52 (art. 12).
38. Id.
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reciprocity (i.e., a contracting state must give no more than it receives).3 ,
With respect to this latter option, reciprocity is limited. "[I]t may not be
applied with respect to the beneficiaries. [For example, a] State that grants
protection to both performers and producers may not refuse protection to
a State that protects only the performer or [the] producer."'
In many respects, the Rome Convention does not adequately protect
producers of sound recordings. Although the Rome Convention gives
producers the exclusive right to control the direct or indirect reproduction
of their product, it does not provide them with the right to control the
distribution of their product,4 t nor does it forbid the importation into a
contracting state of sound recordings that would have been infringements
had they been made in that state.4 2 Moreover, the minimum term of
protection provided in the Rome Convention is twenty years, as compared
to the Berne Convention's basic term of fifty years.43 Further, Article 24
of the Rome Convention limits membership to those states which are party
to one of the international copyright conventions (Berne or UCC).
44
Hence, a number of countries are ineligible to join. Additionally, the Rome
Convention has been criticized for being outdated and unable to "provide
a solution to the problems arising from the present state of technology
unless it is amended so as to broaden the scope of application of its
principles."' 5 Unfortunately, as of this writing, no formal amendment
process has been initiated. Thus, while originally developed to fill the void
left by the Berne Convention with respect to neighboring rights, the Rome
Convention has been largely ineffective.' Indeed, three decades after its
39. I at 54 (art. 16(1)(a)).
40. WIPO GUIDE, supra note 7, at 62.
41. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1 with Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 9-10
(art. 14(1)(i)) (distribution right in cinematographic works).
42. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1 with Berne Convention, supra note 9. at 9, 12
(arts. 13(3), 16) (seizure of infringing copies).
43. Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 52 (art. 14(a)). The term is traced "from the end of
the year in which ... the fixation was made." Id. C. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 5 (art.
7(1)).
44. Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 58 (art. 24(2)).
45. Antonio Mille, The Rome Convention in the Context of Technology and Legal Change,
COPYRIGHT BULL., Vol. XX, No. 4, 1986, at 29.
46. Despite its flaws, the Rome Convention has served as a catalyst for change. The
Intergovernmental Committee established by Article 32 of the Convention to study the
Convention's operation and application has reported that between the years 1961 and 1979, fifty-
one countries had provided protection to one or more of the beneficiaries of the Convention and
twenty-four of these countries had done so for the first time. RICicTSON, supra note 16, at 876
n.227 (citing REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE OF THE ROME Co NVEnON,
Annex 1, para. 15 (1979)).
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introduction, the Rome Convention has only thirty-eight contracting
states.47
IV. THE PHONOGRAMS CONVENTION
In order to remedy the deficiencies of the Rome Convention, the
Phonograms Convention was adopted in 1971. 4  Unlike the Rome
Convention, the Phonograms Convention was established specifically to
combat the piracy of sound recordings.4 9 In addition, the Phonograms
Convention was designed to be accessible to as many countries as
possible.5'
The Phonograms Convention is substantially different from both the
Rome and Berne Conventions. It confers no rights, nor does it expressly
provide for national treatment," but is "simply the acceptance of mutual
obligations between Contracting States."52 Under Article 2, signatories to
the Phonograms Convention undertake to "protect producers of phonograms
who are nationals of other Contracting States"53 against three activities:
(1) the making of duplicates without the consent of the producer,' (2)
their distribution to the public55 and (3) their importation for this pur-
pose.' Member countries of the Phonogramns Convention may implement
47. See supra text accompanying note 7.
48. See supra text accompanying note 1.
49. Article 2 of the Phonograms Convention provides:
Each Contracting State shall protect producers of phonograns who are nationals of
other Contracting States against the making of duplicates without the consent of the
producer and against the importation of such duplicates, provided that any such
making or importation is for the purpose of distribution to the public, and against
the distribution of such duplicates to the public.
Phonograms Convention, supra note 1, at 72.
50. Specifically, the Phonograms Convention is open to any member of the United Nations,
one of its specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or by any parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Id. at 74 (art. 9(l), (2)).
51. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text for discussion of "national treatment."
52. WIPO GUDE, supra note 7, at 102.
53. Note that Article 7(4) of the Phonograms Convention (which corresponds to Article 17
of the Rome Convention) provides that any state which on October 29, 1971, only protects sound
recordings on the basis of fixation may continue to apply that criterion rather than that of the
nationality of the producer. Phonograms Convention, supra note 1. at 73-74.
54. This mirrors the protection offered by Article 10 of the Rome Convention. I. at 72.
55. This remedies the lack of a distribution right in the Rome Convention and allows for
action to be taken against the person selling the infringing duplicates whether or not the
manufacturer of the pirate records can be located. Id
56. Id
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its provisions into their domestic law in a number of ways. Under Article
3, countries may provide "protection by means of the grant of a copyright
or other specific right; protection by means of the law relating to unfair
competition; [or] protection by penal sanctions."'
Like the Rome Convention, Article 6 of the Phonograms Convention
allows member countries to provide the same exceptions for producers as
they provide for authors. However, it allows for compulsory licenses when
three conditions are met: (1) the copies are used only for educational or
scientific research purposes, (2) export of the copies is prohibited, and (3)
equitable remuneration is paid to the original producer, taking into
consideration the number of duplicates which will be made and other
factors.5" Also like the Rome Convention, the term of protection under
the Phonograms Convention is twenty years.59 But, "the twenty-year
minimum only operates if a specific term is prescribed by the domestic law.
In a country which chooses to meet its obligations by means of unfair
competition law, there is often no duration laid down for the civil wrong
committed by the defendant."' 6 Much depends upon the discretion of an
individual judge. Thus, in certain cases, the term may be substantially
longer than that of the Rome Convention and possibly equal to that of the
Berne Convention. In other cases, however, the duration of protection may
be substantially less.
While the Phonograms Convention goes beyond the mere manufactur-
ing of pirate recordings to cover their importation and sale, in some
respects it does not afford producers as many rights as the Rome Conven-
tion. For example, the Phonograms Convention contains no provisions
relating to secondary use of sound recordings. In addition, by not granting
producers any specific rights, the Phonograms Convention might be said to
be a less effective means of protection than the Rome Convention. A
specific right, "whether it is a copyright or a related right, gives the
producer [protection]... analogous to that afforded to authors and has the
advantage of being certain and bringing with it comparatively effective
remedies especially when combined with penal sanctions. ' '6' Furthermore,
by affording states the option of protecting producers through unfair
57. Id. at 73.
58. Phonograms Convention, supra note 1, at 73 (art. 6(a)-(c)).
59. Id. at 73 (art. 4). Unlike the Rome Convention, the Phonograms Convention traces the
term from either the end of the year in which the sounds were first fixed in the sound recording
or from the first publication of the sound recording. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1,
at 52 with Phonograms Convention, supra note 1, at 73.
60. WIPO GUIDE, supra note 7, at 103.
61. See DAViEs, supra note 1, at 40 (para. 120).
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competition laws, the Phonograms Convention is open to the same criticism
leveled at unfair competition laws. Such laws are considered ineffective for
three reasons. First, they provide no remedy against dealers and importers
of pirated recordings in instances where courts find that there has been no
"real" competition between these groups and legitimate producers of sound
recordings.62 Second, "to succeed in an action for unfair competition it
is usually necessary to prove that the duplicate is liable to mislead the
public. If the duplicate itself proclaims the fact that it is illicit, as it
sometimes does, the public is not deceived,"63 and recovery is defeated.
Third, while damages are available as a remedy in unfair competition
actions, more effective remedies such as injunctions, seizures and destruc-
tion of offending goods are generally not available.' Unfortunately,
damage awards are difficult to recover from pirates.65
Thus, while originally developed to remedy certain deficiencies of the
Rome Convention, the Phonograms Convention suffers from a variety of
maladies and is respected by less than half the number of Berne Convention
signatories.' Unfortunately, the Phonograms Convention contains no
provision for revisions, making the possibility of amendments unlikely at
best.
67
V. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
Over the course of its 107-year history, the Berne Convention has
been amended seven times.6 In October 1989, a proposed protocol to the
Berne Convention was initiated by the World Intellectual Property
Organization.69 Since that time, a Committee of Experts has convened in
Geneva on three occasions to discuss the idea."0 While still uncertain, the
62. Id. at 40 (para. 121).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 41 (para. 121).
66. Compare supra note 7 with supra note 9.
67. See WIPO Guim, supra note 7, at 91 (The Phonograms Convention "provides for no
revisions since its object is permanent, and the general consensus on the need for urgency in
attaining its goal does not lend itself to making modifications.").
68. See Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 1.
69. See generally WIPO PRoTOCOL, supra note 6.
70. The meetings were held November 4-8, 1991; February 10-18, 1992; and Nov. 30 to Dec.
4, 1992. Calendar of Meetings, 27 COPYRIGHT 99 (WIPO 1991); Calendar of Meetings, 28
COPYRIGHT 23 (WIPO 1992); Calendar of Meetings, 28 COPYRIGHT 60 (WIPO 1992). Additional
meetings have been scheduled by WIPO for June 21-25, 1993. Calendar of Meetings. 28
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Protocol apparently would be a "special agreement" allowed under Article
20 of the Berne Convention." Presumably, such an agreement would be
easier to effectuate than an outright amendment to the Convention since,
under Article 27(3), any revision of the Berne Convention requires
"unanimity of the votes cast.' 72  As originally drafted, the proposed
Protocol seeks to bring the Berne Convention into line with new and
developing technologies and to address continuing questions of interpreta-
tion that have plagued the Convention since its inception.
With respect to sound recordings, the proposed Protocol is somewhat
controversial. It would grant "authors' rights" to producers of sound
recordings. The original language of the Protocol, drafted by WIPO, reads
as follows:
(a) countries party to the Protocol should ... irrespective of
whether or not they recognize sound recordings as a category of
literary and artistic works-be obliged to grant at least the
following exclusive rights to the producers of sound recordings:
(i) the right of reproduction;
(ii) the right of distribution;
(iii) the right of importation;
(iv) the right of broadcasting and related rights as
provided for inArticle llbis(l) of the Berne
Convention;"
(v) the right of public performance;
(vi) the right of communication to the public by
wire.
74
The Protocol would subject the above rights to the same limitations
contained in Berne Convention Articles 9(2), 5 10,76 l0bis(2)T and
COPYRIGHT 243 (WIPO 1992).
71. Article 20 provides that "[t]he Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right
to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors
more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not
contrary to this Convention." Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 13.
72. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 20 (art. 27(3)).
73. Article 1 lbis(1) of the Berne Convention grants authors the exclusive right of authorizing
the broadcasting of their work, the communication of their work to the public by wire or wireless
diffusion, the rebroadcasting of the broadcast of their work, and the public communication by
loudspeaker or any similar instrument transmitting the broadcast of their work. Id. at 8-9.
74. WIPO PROTOCOL, supra note 6, at 22.
75. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention allows domestic legislation to permit reproduction
"in certain special cases, [i.e., private copying] provided that such reproduction does not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author." Beme Convention, supra note 9, at 7. See generally MASOUY , supra
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1 lbis(3)28 These limitations parallel those contained in Article 15 of the
Rome Convention. In addition, the Protocol would allow for "national
legislation to restrict... the rights of broadcasting, public performance and
communication to the public by wire-to a right to equitable remunera-
tion."'" Although such rights could be subject to compulsory licensing,
the Protocol here proposes allowing any country to recognize such rights
on a reciprocal basis."' This parallels Articles 12 and 16 of the Rome
Convention."1
The term of protection contained in the proposed Protocol is
consistent with the term given to authors of cinematographic works in the
Berne Convention: fifty years from first publication with consent, or, if
unpublished, from the making of the sound recording.82 In return for the
grant of new rights to producers of sound recordings, the proposed Protocol
calls for the "possible exclusion of the application of non-voluntary licenses
for sound recordings."8 3  In substance, the Protocol here proposes the
elimination of Berne Convention Article 13(1), which allows each member
state to implement a system of compulsory licenses for the use of musical
compositions in sound recordings."
note 18, at 55-56 (paras. 9.6-.13).
76. Article 10 allows domestic legislation to permit certain free uses of works, including
quotation of protected works (with attribution) in newspapers and in teaching. Berne Convention,
supra note 9, at 7.
77. Article 10bis(2) allows domestic legislation "to determine the conditions under which, for
the purpose of reporting current events.. . works seen or heard in the course of the event may
... be reproduced and made available to the public." Id. at 7-8.
78. Article 1 lbis(3) allows domestic legislation "to determine the regulations for ephemeral
recordings made by a broadcasting organization by means of its own facilities and used for its
own broadcasts." Id. at 8-9.
79. Wno PROTOCOL, supra note 6, at 22 (pt. I, para. 66).
80. 1& at 23 (paras. 67-68).
81. Compare WIPO PROTOCOL, supra note 6, at 23 (paras. 67-68) with Rome Convention,
supra note 1, at 52, 54 (arts. 12 & 16).
82. See Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 5-6 (art. 7); cf. Phonograms Convention, supra
note 1, at 73 (art. 4).
83. WIPO PROTOCOL, supra note 6. at 16 (pt. Il, paras. 104-08).
84. The argument is that Article 13(1) has outlived its usefulness. It was adopted in 1908 to
protect the then-budding recording industry from potential overreaching by the music publishing
industry and public performance collection agencies. Since that time, antitrust laws have helped
to assuage such fears, and the recording industry "does not need protection against the rights of
authors." Id. at 16 (para. 105).
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VI. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The proposed Protocol has received much criticism, a great deal of
which has been directed at its provisions relating to sound recordings.'
The Executive Committee of the International Literary and Artistic
Association (ALAI) has presented one of the stronger attacks against the
Protocol, and its concerns are representative of those which have surfaced
at the WIPO meetings.8 6 The primary concern appears to be that the
Protocol will erode the existing rights of authors and performers currently
protected under the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention. Another
concern is that the adoption of the Protocol would result in the unfortunate
precedent of creating less than full copyright protection for particular
authors in particular works. This section will address the various arguments
raised by ALAI and other critics of the proposed Protocol.
A. Arguments Based on the Berne Convention Text
Critics argue that the proposed Protocol is inappropriate because the
Berne Convention applies to authors, not to producers, and because sound
recordings are not literary or artistic works.
1. Producers As Authors
As previously indicated, the Berne Convention was designed to protect
authors, not producers. The Berne Convention's conclusion that producers
of sound recordings should not be afforded author status appears to stem
from the belief that a producer performs no creative work: "[Hie does not
create any new, original artistic work but is confined to registering a
particular musical work on a material object and to making copies of such.
Thus, the manufacturer may be compared with the printer of a book who,
surely, nobody would rank as an author!"" The argument against this
rationale is that although a sound recording does "not owe its artistic or
85. See generally Report of the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, BCP/CE/II4 (Nov. 4-8, 1991) (Frst
Session, Geneva).
86. The ALAI position was made clear in a resolution adopted during its meeting held
October 5-6, 1991, in Madrid (document on file with author) [hereinafter ALAI].
87. WILLIAM MAK, RIGHTS AFFECTING THE MANUFACrURE AND USE OF GRAMOPHONE
RECoRDs 148 (1952).
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commercial value or, at any rate, not all of it, to the manufacturer," it
does owe to him the actual fact of its existence... [After all,] it is only
owing to his financial and technical effort that such instruments exist, and
that anybody can buy them at comparatively low prices." 9 The produc-
ers' pivotal role in bringing about the creation of sound recordings is
enormously beneficial to authors and performing artists. A sound recording
"brings the achievements of [authors and] performing artists to places
where otherwise they would maybe never have reached and preserves them
for posterity during the long years after the [authors' and] artists' de-
mise."
Notwithstanding the essential role played by the producers of sound
recordings in bringing music to the world, it has been argued that:
the history of claims for protection of sound recordings ...
shows that these have been advanced by the corporate bodies
that underwrite [them], rather than the individuals concerned.
Rather than protection of the kind accorded to authors (including
moral rights), what has been sought is protection for the
88. There is a critical distinction between the supposedly non-existent artistic contributions
of a producer, see definition supra note 5, and the artistic contributions of a "record producer"
or "recording engineer." With respect to record producers, their "job is to oversee the making
of a master tape from start to finish, including mixing and editing.... For each recording, the
producer must either hire an arranger or write the arrangements for the songs himself ...
[including] the parts for the instruments that will be used to accompany the artist and background
vocals .... [The record producer's] ability to make artistic decisions comes into play constantly
in the planning stages of recording [with] decisions ... concerning musical material and its
treatment." 1ICHAEL FNK INSiDE TnE Music BusNEss 59-60 (1989). With respect to
recording engineers, "[ilt is undoubtedly true that (their] work... has certain artistic qualities:
the selection of apparatus and material, the arrangements of performing artists and microphones,
the manipulation of the sound before the recording---all very important for the success of the
recording--require artistic taste." E.R. GE.DERN, SOUND RECORDINa AND THE DuTcH LAW OF
COPYRIGHT 4 (1948), cited in MAK, supra note 87, at 148. Notwithstanding the creative
contributions of record producers and recording engineers, they are subject to discrimination in
ways similar to producers of sound recordings. They are considered "only part of the mechanical
reproduction process (which] does not add any creative element to the original sound." Id. The
discrimination against the so-called mechanical nature of this type of authorship has been
lambasted by such performing artists as Herbert von Karajan: "If I have the right to ask a
member of the orchestra to play his instrument softer or louder, why should I not also be allowed
to push a button to obtain the same result, if it cannot be achieved any other way? This part of
the work is truly also an artistic activity." INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHONOGRAM AND
V EOwRAm PRODUCERS, SOUND AND AUDIO VisuAL RECORDINGS ARE CULTURAL MATERIALS,
JUST LIKE BooKs 5 (1979) (quoting Herbert von Karajan).
89. MAK, supra note 87, at 151.
90. l at 150.
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financial investment involved in the making of a recording
91
This may be true, but the claims for protection advanced by producers of
sound recordings are no different in kind than claims which have been
successfully advanced by film producers and recognized by the Berne
Convention in Articles 14 and 4bis.' Article 14bis(2)(a) expressly
provides that the "[o]wnership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall
be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed."93
'This may be the maker in his own right... or the maker by reason of a
legal assignment, or it may be the various artistic contributors to the film.
National legislation is free to adopt any of the systems."94 Notwithstand-
ing the decision, the Berne Convention provides that the "owner of
copyright in a cinematographic work shall enjoy the same rights as the
author of an original work."95 Moreover, Article l4bis(2)(b) provides a
presumption of legitimacy that film producers have complete freedom to do
everything necessary (for example, subtitling or dubbing of texts) to ensure
91. RiCKETSON, supra note 16, at 868 (para. 15.43).
92. Article 14 governs the cinematographic rights of the authors of pre-existing works, upon
which a motion picture is based and adapted, while Article 14bis governs the rights of the
contributors to the motion picture. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 9-11.
93. According to Claude Masouy6, Article 14 was designed 'to facilitate the international
circulation of films and, to this end, to seek to bring closer together, if not to unify," the various
legal theories on cinematographic works that existed in the various countries of the Berne Union.
MAsouYt, supra note 18, at 82. He described the three different systems as follows:
a) The "film copyright" system in which only the maker [i.e., the film studio] is the
first owner of the copyright in the film (and not the producer, director, cameraman,
etc.), but in which the rights in those works which go to make up the film and
which can enjoy an existence apart from the film (scenarios, script, music, etc.)
belong without restriction, to the authors, from whom the film-maker must acquire
them by contract, express or implied ....
b) A system in which the film is treated as a work of joint authorship of a number
of artistic contributors (sometimes, but not always, listed in the national law) from
whom the maker must take assignments of their contributions in order to be able
to exploit the film.
c) The system called legal assignment" which also treats the cinematographic work
as one of joint authorship but where the national law presumes a contract with the
maker, assigning the right to exploit the film.
Id
94. Id at 85.
95. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 10 (art. 14bis(1)) (emphasis added).
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the international circulation of their films, unless a contract provides
otherwise.'
While the ownership scheme found in Article 14 is complex, it
provides ample precedent for vesting copyright interests in non-human and,
arguably, noncreative authors. Its primary effect is to ensure proper
distribution of a completed motion picture by allowing authorship to be
vested in the body best able to ensure distribution and to protect against
violations of the works' copyright. The Protocol essentially parallels this
provision for producers of sound recordings, and all arguments against the
Protocol must provide a convincing explanation of why producers of sound
recordings should be treated differently than producers of motion pic-
tures.
2. Sound Recordings As Works
Professor Ricketson has noted that one reason for the exclusion of
sound recordings from the Berne Convention's list of protected "literary
and artistic works" stems from the collective nature of their production.9"
Record production usually involves a team of trained professionals, giving
rise to concerns about correctly identifying the authors of a particular sound
recording:
Although the collective nature of the undertaking cannot, in
itself, be an objection to inclusion [of sound recordings] in
Article 2(1), as joint and collective authorship are clearly
recognised [in Berne Convention Articles 2(5) and 7bis], the
determination of who should be regarded as an author in the
case of a sound recording of a musical or dramatic work can be
a difficult question. For example, with a sound recording ...
would the "authors" include the sound engineer, the record
producer and the various performers or actors who contribute to
the making of the final recording?"
The proposed Protocol solves this potential identification problem by
presuming the producer to be the author of the sound recording."W While
96. Article 14bis(3) limits this presumption, making it inapplicable to "authors of scenarios,
dialogues and musical works created for the making of the cinematographic work, or to the
principal director thereof." Beme Convention, supra note 9, at 11.
97. WIPO PROTOCOL, supra note 6, at 20.
98. RICKETSON, supra note 16, at 868 (para. 15.43).
99. Id.
100. WIPO PROTOCOL, supra note 6, at 20.
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this presumption is not without problems, it is no different than the
presumption presently contained in Article 14 of the Berne Convention with
respect to cinematographic works,01 and serves the same purposes:
vesting rights of authorship in the body best able to ensure distribution and
protecting against violation of the work's copyright. Moreover, the
presumption merely legislates the standard practice of the music industry
which, as a matter of course, by contract, expressly vests the copyright of
sound recordings in the record company or production entity.
B. Arguments Based on the Rome Convention
Critics argue that if the proposed Protocol were adopted, the delicate
balance created between the protection of authors' rights and neighboring
rights would be "completely and unwarrantedly upset.""l 2 They maintain
that the proposed Protocol violates Article 20 of the Beme Convention,
which mandates that special agreements must "grant to authors more
extensive rights than those granted by the Convention.""0 3
In both the Rome Convention and the Phonograms Convention, the
delicate balance between the protection of authors' rights and so-called
"neighboring rights" was maintained by expressly providing that the rights
of producers would "leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection
of copyright in literary and artistic works.""m This safeguard clause was
inserted in both Conventions to placate adherents of the so-called "cake
theory," which was originally advanced and rejected during the debates
surrounding the adoption of the Rome Convention. 5 This theory held
that because traditional users of music are accustomed to paying a given
sum for copyright dues, drastic consequences would result if they were
faced with additional demands. These consequences would include lower
offers for copyrights, a substantial decline in their use, or the abandonment
of the use of copyrights. The theory "assumes the amount payable for the
101. Article 14, of course, affords countries the option of choosing to vest copyright in either
the film's producer or the various artistic contributors to the film. The Protocol provides no such
option; the rights vest in the producer. See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
102. See ALAI, supra note 86.
103. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 13 (art. 20).
104. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 1, at 44 (art. 1), with Phonograms Convention,
supra note 1, at 73-74 (art 7).
105. See generally RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS, PRODUCERS OF PHONOORAMS AND BROAD ASTIG ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1968).
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use of music is a fixed sum. If the cake has to be divided, the authors will
be given a smaller slice."1°6
However, "[i]nformation from recent meetings of the Intergovern-
mental Committee of the Rome Convention has shown that authors' fears
were ultimately unfounded and that, quite the contrary, the protection
afforded to performing artists, producers and operators serves to safeguard
authors' remuneration."'"
In these days, ... when every form of intellectual property is
under attack, it is becoming more widely recognized that the
rights of authors are not weakened or whittled away, but on the
contrary strengthened, by the granting and upholding of parallel
rights for producers of phonograms .... This recognition,
which has led to increasing solidarity among right owners, has
been the one and only benefit of piracy: it has been recognized
by authors that every time a phonogram is copied without
permission, the composer and the author suffer a loss as well as
the performers and the phonogram producer and that the latter
is in a better position if he has a right of his own to take quick
and effective action against infringement, since, thanks to his
marketing organization, he can keep a check on the market more
easily than the author's society, however well organized it may
be.108
It was also argued during the debates surrounding the formation of the
Rome Convention that the owners of the newly-created rights might invoke
these rights to prohibit uses that the authors might themselves have
permitted. In other words, granting exclusive rights, not just compensation,
can create "hold out" problems. 19 Here again it is important to "distin-
guish... between the right and its exercise since it is only in the exercise
of the right that conflicts of interest can arise."'10 Why would a producer
of a sound recording ever hold out and prohibit uses that an author or a
performer might otherwise permit? Assuming that producers are rational,
wealth-maximizing transactors, there would seem to be no financial
incentive for such behavior. Indeed, the more a sound recording is
106. WIPO GUIDE, supra note 7, at 17.
107. Pierre Chesnais, The Rome Convention: Twenty-five Years Later, COPYRIGHT BULL,
Vol. XX, No. 4, 1986, at 9.
108. Davies, supra note 27, at 15-16 (emphasis added).
109. See generally READINGS IN ECONOMICS OF CONTRACr LAW 139-40 (Victor P. Goldberg,
ed. 1989).
110. WIPO GUIDE, supra note 7, at 17.
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exploited in the marketplace, the more the producer stands to gain. Hold
out fears have proven to be unfounded since the adoption of the Rome
Convention in 1961, and would seem to be equally unfounded with respect
to the proposed Protocol. It must be recognized that as the threat of digital
piracy looms larger, authors, performers and producers have far more in
common than not, and that cooperation is far more beneficial than
competition."'
C. Leaving Performers Out in the Cold
Critics argue that if the proposed Protocol to the Berne Convention
was adopted, the balance created in 1961 between the different beneficiaries
of the Rome Convention would be "seriously compromised."'1 2 By
vesting rights immediately in the producer of the sound recording, the
Protocol eliminates the need for users to negotiate with performers. In the
event that a country is not already a party to the Rome Convention, the
Protocol leaves that country's performers "out in the cold." In the event
that a country is a party to the Rome Convention, adoption of the Protocol
would subject that country to criticism that it is violating Article 22 of the
Rome Convention, which allows for special agreements between contracting
states only if they "grant to performers, producers of phonograms or
broadcasting organisations more extensive rights than those granted by [the
Rome] Convention or contain other provisions not contrary to [it]."
'" 3
One solution would involve two changes in the Protocol. The first
would vest rights initially in performers, thereby granting performers more
extensive rights. The second would include a provision similar to Article
14bis(2)(b) in the Berne Convention, establishing a presumption that such
rights are assigned to producers of sound recordings embodying such
performances, unless specified otherwise by contract. However, this
solution would be subject to the traditional criticisms of Article 14-need-
less complexity and uncertainty in application. Moreover, this solution
completely ignores the real reason the Protocol was proposed in the first
place-the rising tide of digital piracy. Vesting copyright interests in the
performers of sound recordings would do nothing to address this threat.
Indeed, of the three parties with legal interests in sound recordings,
11. Cf. Phonograms Convention, supra note 1, at72 (pmbl.): "The protection of producers
of phonograms against such acts (of piracy] wili also benefit the performers whose performances,
and authors whose works, are recorded on the said phonograms."
112. See ALAI, supra note 86.
113. Rome Convention. supra note 1, at 58 (art. 22) (emphasis added).
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performers are perhaps in the worst position to protect against copyright
violations. Producers know the market for sound recordings far better than
do performers or authors; it is their business to know the competition, both
legal and illegal. They are in a unique position to watch for the piracy of
their wares, and they have established formidable trade associations to
perform this function. Accordingly, it would appear to be in the best
interests of authors and performers to allow the copyright in sound
recordings to vest initially in the producer."4
D. The "Slippery Slope" Argument
Critics argue that if the proposed Protocol were adopted, it would
seriously weaken the Berne Convention by substantially altering its very
nature. The Protocol's provisions, which subject public performance rights
to compulsory licenses and reciprocity, would be a slippery slope, leading
to a similar dilution of the protections presently afforded to other works.
As mentioned above, the rights afforded by the proposed Protocol
would be subject to certain limitations contained in the Beme Convention.
For example, they would be subject to national legislation regarding private
copying, fair use, current events reporting, and ephemeral recordings made
by broadcasting organizations. In addition to these limitations, the Protocol
would not grant producers a pure public performance right; the right would
be subject to compulsory licenses and possibly subject to reciprocity. The
effect of these limitations, critics charge, is to create a "less than perfect"
copyright in sound recordings, signalling a general trend of diluting the
protection afforded to other Berne Convention works.
The above criticism is premised on the notion that all Berne
Convention works presently enjoy the full scope of copyright protection.
However, the Berne Convention does not treat all works equally. Certain
works have additional rights, for example, cinematographic works enjoy an
explicit right of distribution.1 5 Other works have a shorter term of
protection, for example, photographs and works of applied art are
guaranteed protection for only twenty-five years. 6 Still other works are
presently subject to compulsory licenses, for example, musical compositions
114. As one commentator has noted, "performers (and authors) can only make contractual
arrangements with producers... if these [parties] retain full control of their products. If not,
there is not much to bargain about." Rolf Rembe, Authors and Performers: Equal Contribution;
Equal Protection, COPYRIGHT BULL., Vol. XX, No. 4, 1986, at 31.
115. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at 9-10 (art. 14(1)).
116. Mr, at 6 (art. 7(4)).
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are subject to compulsory licensing for use in sound recordings (although
the proposed Protocol would eliminate this provision)."' As these
examples indicate, the Berne Convention has historically accepted
compromises and accorded different works different amounts of protection.
The creation of a "less than perfect" copyright in sound recordings merely
continues this tradition, at a time when producers, performers and authors
need it most.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the age of digital piracy, the distinction between authors' rights and
neighboring rights is of dwindling significance."" The interests of
producers, performers and authors are threatened by the common foe of
digital piracy. The proposed Protocol to the Berne Convention would
amend it to provide author-like protection to producers of sound recordings
in ways similar to the Rome Convention and the Phonograms Convention.
It would correct the historic anomaly which presently prevents the Berne
Convention from protecting producers of sound recordings, and at the same
time redress many of the inadequacies of the Rome Convention and
Phonograms Convention. It is an efficient means of protecting the common
interests of all parties concerned.
117. 1d art. 13(1); WIPO PROTOCOL, supra note 6, at 16 (pt. HI, paras. 104-08).
118. See Neil Turkewitz, The Fallacy of the Author/Producer Distinction, RIGHTs:
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE SERVICE OF CREATIrrY, 1989, at 6-7 (concluding that
copyright protection should not be based on substantive protection of authors but should focus
on "adequate and effective protection for works").
